Almost as bad as an electrical fire aboard an ETOPS airplane

Fire in a submarine under the water has obvious parallels to fire in an ETOPS (extended range operations) airplane flying high above the water and distant from a suitable airfield. In both situations, the fire has to be fought "in place" until the airplane can land or the submarine rise to the surface. The case at hand involves the Oct. 4 electrical fire on board the Canadian submarine HMCS Chicoutimi off the west coast of Ireland. The submersible, previously operated by Britain's Royal Navy as HMS Upholder, is a 30-year-old dieselelectric long-range patrol submarine. Details are sketchy, but think of fire aboard aircraft in the context of this accident:

* Two electrical fires broke out while the vessel was preparing to submerge, causing extensive damage to electrical cabling. Huge sparks erupted from an electrical display panel near the control room. The first and major fire burned on both the first and second decks. (ASW note: one account has the sub submerged when the fire broke out, forcing it to surface in 30-knot surface winds and huge swells to blow smoke.)The second fire was in, or very close to, the boat's oxygen generator plant.

* The entire submarine was filled quickly with smoke. The captain said the smoke was so thick a flashlight shining could not be seen more than six inches away.

* Nine of the 57 crewmembers suffered smoke inhalation. Three of the men were so disabled by smoke that they were evacuated by helicopter. Lt. Chris Saunders, a combat systems engineer, died after being evacuated by helicopter to a hospital on shore.

* Propulsion power was lost.

* Ship-to-shore communications were lost after key electrical cables were knocked out. An officer used a battery-powered portable satellite phone to send a Mayday.

* The sub was left with the starboard diesel running to provide ventilation, lights and short-range communications.

* A half-dozen cell-phones were later passed on board from a nearby tug so that crewmen could call loved ones ashore.

* A separate inquiry is under way into the failure of the breathing apparatus to protect those killed and injured from toxic smoke and gas.

* A similar fire occurred in sister sub HMCS Windsor last spring, also involving electrical cables that ran past the commander's cabin.

For aviation and ETOPS, note the limited number of portable fire extinguishers in a typical aircraft cabin. Note that the fire protection in the belly holds involves suppressing, not extinguishing a fire until the airplane lands. Note that a cargo of lithium batteries could burn right through the cargo hold, unaffected by Halon (see ASW, July 26). Note that inaccessible spaces containing flammable materials and electrical components are not protected by detection or suppression. Note further that current regulations involve less stringent flammability standards for materials used within the pressure vessel but which are outside the occupied areas. In other words, the materials in hidden spaces may be more burnable (see ASW, March 22). Note further concerns expressed earlier this year by Wendy Tadros of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada about the lack of progress regarding the need for integrated strategies to combat in-flight fires * The crew used up most of the portable fire-fighting gear to extinguish the blazes